R. v. Daviault

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Case Brief
Facts

The accused, Daviault, was charged with sexual assault. He consumed a large quantity of alcohol, including brandy at the complainant's residence, a 65-year-old partially paralyzed woman. Daviault had no recollection of the events that occurred after arriving at the complainant's residence. The trial judge found that Daviault committed the assault but acquitted him due to reasonable doubt about whether he possessed the minimal intent necessary for the offense due to extreme intoxication. The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal, holding that self-induced intoxication akin to automatism is not a defense to a general intent offense.

Issues

Does the rule that the mens rea of a general intent offense cannot be negated by drunkenness violate sections 7 (fundamental justice) and 11(d) (presumption of innocence) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Can extreme intoxication akin to automatism or insanity negate the intent required for a general intent offence?

Legal Analysis

The Supreme Court considered whether the strict application of the Leary rule (that drunkenness cannot negate the mens rea of a general intent offense) violates the Charter. The majority held that it does violate sections 7 and 11(d). They reasoned that eliminating the mental element deprives an accused of fundamental justice, and the presumption of innocence requires the Crown to prove all elements of the crime. They also noted voluntary intoxication does not automatically mean the consequences are predictable or voluntary. The Court adopts a flexible approach, allowing evidence of extreme intoxication (akin to automatism or insanity) to be considered, but the accused bears the burden of proving this state on a balance of probabilities. The court acknowledged that the heavy burden of proof on the accused violates s. 11(d) of the Charter, but deems it justifiable under s. 1.

Decision

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered. The Supreme Court held that extreme intoxication akin to automatism can negate the mens rea for a general intent offense, but the accused bears the burden of proving this state on a balance of probabilities. The Leary rule was modified to allow for this exception in rare cases of extreme intoxication. Sopinka, Gonthier, and Major JJ. dissented, arguing that the Leary rule should stand and that voluntary intoxication should not excuse criminal conduct.

Transcript
Welcome back to Casepod, legal eagles! Today, we're diving deep into a truly fascinating and controversial case: *R. v. Daviault*. This case throws a spotlight on the tricky intersection of intoxication, criminal intent, and our fundamental rights. The facts, in brief, are disturbing. Daviault was charged with sexually assaulting a 65-year-old woman. He was incredibly drunk, so drunk he had no memory of the event. Now, here's the kicker: at trial, the judge believed Daviault committed the act, but acquitted him. Why? Because the judge wasn't convinced Daviault possessed the *mens rea* – the necessary mental intent – due to his extreme intoxication. The Court of Appeal flipped that decision, saying you can't use self-induced intoxication as a defense for a general intent crime. This brings us to the big legal questions: Does preventing someone from using intoxication as a defense violate their Charter rights? Specifically, sections 7 (fundamental justice) and 11(d) (presumption of innocence)? And can *extreme* intoxication, to the point of automatism, actually negate the intent needed for a crime? The Supreme Court grappled with these issues, and their analysis is really compelling. They looked at the long-standing "Leary rule," which basically said drunkenness is no excuse. The majority decided that *blindly* applying this rule *does* violate the Charter. Stripping away the mental element entirely, they argued, is fundamentally unjust. Plus, the Crown has to prove *every* element of a crime, including intent, to maintain the presumption of innocence. It's not as simple as saying "he was drunk, so he's not responsible." The Court acknowledged that just because someone gets drunk doesn't automatically mean they intended the consequences of their actions. But they also couldn't just throw the door open to everyone claiming intoxication as a get-out-of-jail-free card. So, they landed on a compromise. They said *extreme* intoxication, akin to automatism or even insanity, *can* be considered. But – and this is a big but – the accused has to *prove* they were in this state, on a balance of probabilities. A tough hurdle to clear. The Court even admitted that placing this burden of proof on the accused violates section 11(d) of the Charter! But they justified it under section 1, the "reasonable limits" clause. They argued that society's need to protect itself from violent crime outweighs the infringement on the presumption of innocence in these rare cases. Ultimately, the Supreme Court allowed Daviault's appeal and ordered a new trial. They modified the Leary rule, creating this narrow exception for extreme intoxication. But it wasn't unanimous. Three judges dissented, arguing the Leary rule should stand firm. *Daviault* is still debated today. It highlights the complex balancing act our legal system performs, weighing individual rights against the need for public safety. What do you think? Did the Supreme Court strike the right balance, or should the Leary rule have remained untouched? It’s a fascinating point to ponder.