R. v. Ruzic

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Case Brief
Facts

Marijana Ruzic was charged with importing heroin into Canada and using a false passport. She admitted to committing the offences but claimed she acted under duress because a man in Belgrade threatened to harm her mother if she didn't bring the heroin to Canada. Ruzic argued that the statutory defence of duress under s. 17 of the Criminal Code, which requires the threat to be of immediate death or bodily harm from a person present when the offence is committed, was unconstitutional. She successfully challenged s. 17 under s. 7 of the Charter, raised the common law defence of duress, and was acquitted. The Crown appealed, but the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

Issues

1. Does s. 17 of the Criminal Code, which restricts the defence of duress to threats of immediate death or bodily harm from a person present when the offence is committed, infringe s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice)? 2. If s. 17 infringes s. 7, is the infringement justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter (reasonable limits)? 3. Was the trial judge correct in allowing the common law defence of duress to go to the jury, and did the trial judge adequately instruct the jury on the defence?

Legal Analysis

The court found that s. 17 of the Criminal Code does infringe s. 7 of the Charter because it allows for the criminal conviction of individuals who acted involuntarily due to duress. The immediacy and presence requirements in s. 17 are too restrictive and do not adequately account for situations where a person's will is overborne, even if the threat is not immediate or from someone physically present. The court also held that the Crown failed to justify the infringement under s. 1 of the Charter. The court further clarified that the common law defence of duress was not entirely superseded by s. 17 and remains available, offering a more flexible and Charter-compliant framework. The common law defence requires proportionality between the threat and the criminal act, assessed using an objective-subjective standard, and that the accused had no safe avenue of escape.

Decision

The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal's decision, finding that s. 17 of the Criminal Code unjustifiably infringes s. 7 of the Charter. The Court affirmed that the common law defence of duress remains available and that the trial judge had properly instructed the jury on this defence. The court emphasized the need for a close temporal connection between the threat and the harm threatened when instructing juries on the common law defence of duress.

Transcript
Okay, welcome back to Casepod, legal eagles! Today, we're diving into a fascinating case about duress, the Charter, and a whole lot of heroin. Buckle up, because this one's a wild ride. We're talking about *Ruzic*, a case that really shook up our understanding of the defence of duress in Canada. The facts are relatively straightforward: Marijana Ruzic was caught importing heroin using a fake passport. Cut and dried, right? Wrong. Ruzic admitted to it all, but she claimed she was acting under duress. A man in Belgrade threatened to hurt her mother if she didn't do it. Now, here's where it gets interesting. At the time, Section 17 of the Criminal Code had a very specific definition of duress. It basically said the threat had to be of *immediate* death or bodily harm, and the person making the threat had to be *right there* when you committed the crime. Ruzic argued that this section was unconstitutional, violating her Section 7 Charter rights - the right to life, liberty, and security of the person. She said it was fundamentally unjust to convict someone who acted because their will was essentially overborne by a threat. The lower court agreed, and she was acquitted. The Crown appealed, and eventually, it landed at the Supreme Court. So, the big questions here were threefold: First, does this restrictive definition of duress in Section 17 actually violate Section 7 of the Charter? Second, if it *does*, is that violation justified under Section 1, the "reasonable limits" clause? And third, was the trial judge right to even let the jury consider the common law defence of duress, which is a bit more flexible than the statutory definition? The Supreme Court sided with Ruzic. They said that Section 17 *did* infringe Section 7. The court reasoned that the immediacy and presence requirements were just too rigid. They didn't account for situations where someone's will is truly overborne, even if the threat isn't happening *right now* or from someone standing right next to them. Think about it – a credible threat to harm a loved one far away can be just as coercive. And the Crown? They failed to convince the court that this infringement was a "reasonable limit" under Section 1. But here's the real kicker: the court clarified that the common law defence of duress wasn't totally wiped out by Section 17. It *still* existed! This is huge because the common law defence is more flexible and, according to the court, more in line with the Charter. The common law defence requires a proportionality assessment – is the threat proportional to the crime? And did the accused have a safe way out? The court emphasized the need for a close *temporal* connection between the threat and the harm threatened when instructing juries on the common law defence. In the end, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal. *Ruzic* is a landmark case because it highlights the importance of a flexible and Charter-compliant approach to the defence of duress. It’s not just about ticking boxes on a checklist of "immediate threat" and "present person." It's about whether a person's will was truly overborne, making them act involuntarily. It's a fascinating intersection of criminal law, constitutional rights, and the very human experience of fear and coercion.