R. v. Ruzic

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Case Brief
Facts

Marijana Ruzic was charged with importing heroin and using a false passport. She admitted to the offenses but claimed she acted under duress because a man in Belgrade threatened to harm her mother if she didn't bring the heroin to Canada. Ruzic didn't seek police protection because she believed the Belgrade police were corrupt. Her defense of duress did not meet the requirements of s. 17 of the Criminal Code, which requires the threat to be of immediate death or bodily harm from a person present when the offense is committed. Ruzic challenged the constitutionality of s. 17 under s. 7 of the Charter and raised the common law defense of duress, ultimately being acquitted. The Crown appealed, but the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

Issues

1. Does s. 17 of the Criminal Code, which restricts the defense of duress to threats of immediate death or bodily harm from a person present when the offense is committed, infringe s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (fundamental justice)? 2. If so, is the infringement justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter? 3. Was the trial judge correct in allowing the common law defense of duress to go to the jury, and were the jury instructions adequate?

Legal Analysis

The Court found that s. 17 of the Criminal Code breaches s. 7 of the Charter because it allows individuals who acted involuntarily to be held criminally liable. The immediacy and presence requirements of s. 17 are too restrictive and do not account for situations where threats of future harm or threats to third parties compel a person to commit a crime. The Crown failed to justify these restrictions under s. 1 of the Charter. The Court also held that the common law defense of duress was not entirely superseded by s. 17 and remains available. The common law defense, without the immediacy and presence constraints, is more in line with Charter values. The Court emphasized that the common law defense requires a proportionality between the threat and the criminal act and that the accused must have no safe avenue of escape. The Court upheld the trial judge's decision to allow the common law defense to go to the jury, finding the instructions adequate, although suggesting further clarity on the temporal connection between the threat and harm in future cases.

Decision

The appeal was dismissed. The Court upheld the acquittal, finding that s. 17 of the Criminal Code infringes s. 7 of the Charter and is not justified under s. 1. The Court also affirmed the availability of the common law defense of duress, subject to certain conditions, and found that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on this defense.

Transcript
Okay, Casepod listeners, buckle up! We're diving into Ruzic, a case that really challenged our understanding of duress in Canadian law. So, the basic story: Marijana Ruzic gets caught importing heroin and using a fake passport. Not great. But she admits to it all, claiming she was forced. A man in Belgrade threatened her mother if she didn't comply. Now, here's where things get interesting. The existing law, Section 17 of the Criminal Code, is pretty strict. It says duress only applies if the threat is of *immediate* death or bodily harm, and from someone *physically present* when the crime happens. Ruzic's situation didn't fit. Threat to her mother, not immediate, and the guy was in another country. This brings us to the first big issue: Does Section 17 violate Section 7 of the Charter, our right to life, liberty, and security of the person, and fundamental justice? The court said, "Yes, it does." Think about it: Section 17 could hold someone criminally liable even if they acted completely involuntarily, driven by a credible threat. The Court felt that the immediacy and presence requirements were too rigid. What if the threat is to a loved one? What if the harm is delayed, but still unavoidable? Section 17 didn’t account for these realities. Then, the Crown tried to argue that even if Section 17 *did* infringe on Charter rights, it was a reasonable limit under Section 1. The Court wasn’t buying it. They didn't think the Crown had justified these restrictions. But there's more! Ruzic also argued for the common law defense of duress, basically judge-made law. The court agreed that this defense still existed *alongside* Section 17. The beauty of the common law defense is that it's more flexible. It doesn't have those strict immediacy and presence requirements. Importantly, the court emphasized that the common law defense still requires proportionality. The threat has to be serious enough to justify the crime, and the accused has to have no reasonable way out. You can't claim duress if you could have gone to the police, for example. Unless there is a reason like in this case where the accused did not trust that police protection would be effective. Ultimately, the Court upheld Ruzic's acquittal. They ruled that Section 17 was unconstitutional, and that the common law defense was properly presented to the jury. Ruzic is a landmark case because it acknowledges that people can be forced into criminal behavior by threats that aren't necessarily immediate or made in person. It forces us to consider the real-world pressures people face and ensures our legal system doesn't punish those who truly had no other choice. A fascinating case that highlights the importance of a flexible and just legal system.