R. v. Ruzic

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Case Brief
Facts

Marijana Ruzic was charged with importing heroin and using a false passport. She admitted to committing the offences but claimed she acted under duress because a man in Belgrade threatened to harm her mother if she did not bring the heroin to Canada. Ruzic did not seek police protection because she believed the Belgrade police were corrupt. Her duress claim did not meet the requirements of s. 17 of the Criminal Code, which requires the threat to be of immediate death or bodily harm from a person present when the offence is committed. She successfully challenged the constitutionality of s. 17 and raised the common law defence of duress, leading to her acquittal. The Crown appealed, but the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

Issues

1. Does s. 17 of the Criminal Code, which provides a defence of compulsion by threats but requires the threat to be of immediate death or bodily harm from a person present when the offence is committed, infringe s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (fundamental justice)? 2. If so, is the infringement justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter? 3. Was the trial judge correct in allowing the common law defence of duress to go to the jury, and did the judge adequately instruct the jury on the defence?

Legal Analysis

The Court found that s. 17 of the Criminal Code breaches s. 7 of the Charter because it allows individuals who acted involuntarily to be held criminally liable. The immediacy and presence requirements of s. 17 are too restrictive and do not align with the principle that only voluntary conduct should attract criminal liability. The Crown failed to justify these restrictions under s. 1 of the Charter. The Court also held that the common law defence of duress was not entirely superseded by s. 17 and remains available, and that the common law defence is more in line with Charter values, particularly regarding the absence of immediacy and presence requirements. The Court emphasized the importance of proportionality between the threat and the criminal act, and the need to consider whether the accused had a safe avenue of escape. The Court found that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the common law defence of duress.

Decision

The appeal was dismissed. The Court upheld the acquittal of Ruzic, finding that s. 17 of the Criminal Code infringes s. 7 of the Charter and is not justified under s. 1. The Court also affirmed that the common law defence of duress was properly presented to the jury.

Transcript
Welcome back to Casepod, legal eagles! Today, we're diving into Ruzic, a case that really shakes up our understanding of duress in Canadian criminal law. So, the basic story is this: Marijana Ruzic was caught importing heroin and using a fake passport. Not great, right? But here’s the kicker: she admitted to it, but claimed she was forced. A man in Belgrade threatened her mother if she didn’t mule the drugs into Canada. Now, normally, that sounds like duress, a classic "I was forced to do it" defense. But here's where it gets complicated. Section 17 of the Criminal Code, which deals with compulsion, has some very specific requirements. The threat has to be of immediate death or bodily harm, and the person making the threat has to be *right there* when you commit the crime. Ruzic's situation didn't fit. The threat wasn't immediate; it was her mother back in Belgrade. And the guy making the threat wasn't present in Canada. So, she couldn't use Section 17. But that's not the end of the story! Ruzic’s legal team challenged the constitutionality of Section 17 itself, arguing it violated her fundamental rights under the Charter. And guess what? She won! The Court essentially said, "Wait a minute. Section 17 is too narrow. It's not fair to hold someone criminally liable if they were truly acting involuntarily, even if the threat wasn't immediate or the person wasn't physically present." The Court focused on Section 7 of the Charter – fundamental justice. They argued that criminal liability should only attach to voluntary actions. If someone is truly compelled, truly acting without free will, then holding them fully responsible goes against the principles of justice. The Crown tried to argue that these restrictions were justified under Section 1 of the Charter, which allows for reasonable limits on rights. But the Court wasn’t buying it. The other fascinating part of this case is the role of the common law defence of duress. The Court clarified that the common law defence, which is more flexible than Section 17, still exists! It's not completely overridden by the statutory defence. This meant that Ruzic could argue duress based on the common law, which doesn't have those strict immediacy and presence requirements. Now, the common law defence isn't a free pass. The Court emphasized that the threat still has to be serious, and there needs to be a proportionality between the threat and the crime committed. Plus, they stressed that the accused needs to have no safe avenue of escape. Ultimately, the Court upheld Ruzic's acquittal. They found that Section 17 was unconstitutional and that the trial judge had properly instructed the jury on the common law defence of duress. Ruzic is a landmark case. It highlights the importance of considering the individual circumstances when assessing duress and ensures that our criminal law aligns with fundamental principles of justice. It forces us to ask: when is someone truly acting voluntarily, and when are they so compelled that holding them fully responsible would be unfair? It's a tough question, but Ruzic gives us a crucial framework for answering it.