R. v. Ruzic

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Case Brief

Facts

Marijana Ruzic was charged with importing heroin and using a false passport. She admitted to the offenses but claimed she acted under duress because a man in Belgrade threatened to harm her mother if she didn't bring the heroin to Canada. Ruzic did not seek police protection because she believed the Belgrade police were corrupt. Her defense of duress did not meet the requirements of s. 17 of the Criminal Code, which requires the threat to be of immediate death or bodily harm from a person present when the offense is committed. Ruzic challenged the constitutionality of s. 17 and raised the common-law defense of duress. She was acquitted, and the Crown appealed.

Issues

1. Does s. 17 of the Criminal Code, which restricts the defense of duress to threats of immediate death or bodily harm from a person present when the offense is committed, infringe s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 2. If so, is the infringement justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter? 3. Was the trial judge correct in allowing the common-law defense of duress to go to the jury, and did the judge adequately instruct the jury on the defense?

Legal Analysis

The Court held that s. 17 of the Criminal Code breaches s. 7 of the Charter because it allows individuals who acted involuntarily to be declared criminally liable. The immediacy and presence requirements are overly restrictive and do not align with the principle that only voluntary conduct should attract criminal liability. The Crown failed to justify these restrictions under s. 1 of the Charter. The Court also found that the common-law defense of duress was not entirely superseded by s. 17 and remains available. The common-law defense, which does not have the same immediacy and presence requirements, is more consistent with Charter values. The Court emphasized the importance of a proportionality requirement between the threat and the criminal act, assessed using an objective-subjective standard. The accused must have no safe avenue of escape. The trial judge's instructions to the jury were deemed adequate, though future instructions should explicitly address the temporal connection between the threat and the harm threatened, and the objective-subjective assessment of the safe avenue of escape test. The law does not always require an accused to seek police protection, and the objective standard must consider the accused's specific circumstances.

Decision

The appeal was dismissed. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision, upholding the acquittal. The Court found that s. 17 of the Criminal Code unjustifiably infringed s. 7 of the Charter, and that the common-law defense of duress was properly presented to the jury.

Transcript

Welcome back to Casepod, legal eagles! Today, we're diving into Ruzic, a fascinating case that tackles duress, the Criminal Code, and the Charter. So, picture this: Marijana Ruzic gets caught importing heroin and using a fake passport. Not a great start, right? But here's the twist: she admits to it, claims she was threatened. A guy in Belgrade said he'd hurt her mom if she didn't do it. Now, under section 17 of the Criminal Code, duress only works if the threat is of immediate death or bodily harm, and the bad guy has to be right there. Ruzic's situation didn't fit. So, her lawyers challenged the law itself, arguing it violated her Charter rights, and also raised the common-law defense of duress. She was acquitted! The Crown appealed, and that's where the legal fireworks really started. The big questions were: Does section 17, with its strict "immediate threat" rule, violate Section 7 of the Charter, which protects our life, liberty, and security? And if it does, can the government justify that violation? Finally, did the judge mess up by letting the jury consider the common-law defense of duress? The Court said that s. 17 *does* violate s. 7! Why? Because it could punish people who acted involuntarily. The "immediacy" and "presence" requirements were too strict. The Court felt that only voluntary actions should be punished. And the Crown couldn't justify these restrictions under Section 1 of the Charter. But here's the kicker: the Court also said that the common-law defense of duress still exists! It wasn't completely replaced by section 17. The common-law defense doesn't have those super-strict "immediacy" rules, so it's more in line with Charter values. The Court emphasized proportionality. Was the threat proportional to the crime? They use a "objective-subjective" standard. Meaning, would a reasonable person in Ruzic's shoes have felt they had no safe way out? Importantly, the Court noted the law doesn't *always* require someone to run to the police. The “reasonable person” standard has to consider the accused's specific situation. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed. Ruzic's acquittal stood. The Court agreed that section 17 of the Criminal Code unfairly violated her Charter rights, and that the jury was right to consider the common-law defense. Ruzic is important because it balances the need to hold people accountable with the reality that sometimes, people are forced into terrible situations. It reminds us that context matters, and that a rigid law isn't always a just one.