R. v. George

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Case Brief
Facts

Barbara George, aged 35, had sexual intercourse with C.D., a male youth of approximately 14 and a half years old. George presumed C.D. was around 17. She was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault. Her defense was mistake of age, which, under section 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code, requires the accused to have taken all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age. The trial judge acquitted George, finding reasonable doubt as to whether the Crown proved she failed to take all reasonable steps. The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, quashed the acquittals, and ordered a new trial.

Issues

1. Did the trial judge make legal errors in the reasonable steps analysis under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code? 2. If so, were the errors sufficiently material to justify appellate intervention by the Court of Appeal, considering that Crown appeals against acquittals are limited to questions of law alone? 3. Can evidence arising after the sexual activity be considered when determining if the accused took reasonable steps?

Legal Analysis

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Crown appeals against acquittals in proceedings by indictment are limited to questions of law alone. The Court found that the trial judgment did not contain any errors of law, meaning the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to interfere. The Court emphasized that determining what raises a reasonable doubt is a highly contextual, fact-specific exercise. The more reasonable an accused's perception of the complainant's age, the fewer steps are reasonably required. The trial judge properly considered various factors in assessing the reasonableness of George’s perception of C.D.’s age. The Court also clarified that evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of the accused person’s perception of the complainant’s age before sexual contact is relevant, even if that evidence happens to arise after the sexual activity or was not known to the accused before the sexual activity. Furthermore, even if the trial judge had made legal errors, they would not have justified the intervention of the Court of Appeal because there was no reasonable degree of certainty that the alleged errors were material to the trial judge’s verdict.

Decision

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals. The Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the trial judge's decision because there were no errors of law. The trial judge's analysis of whether George took reasonable steps was fact-specific and contextual, and the Court of Appeal improperly translated strong opposition to the trial judge’s factual inferences into supposed legal errors. The Court also held that the threshold of materiality required to justify appellate intervention in a Crown appeal from an acquittal was not met.

Transcript
Welcome back to Casepod, where we dissect landmark legal cases. Today, we're diving into R. v. George, a fascinating case concerning sexual interference and sexual assault, but more importantly, the complex defense of "mistake of age." So, the facts: Barbara George, a 35-year-old woman, had sexual relations with a young man we'll call C.D., who was about 14 and a half. George believed he was closer to 17. She was charged, and her defense hinged on that mistake. The Criminal Code, specifically section 150.1(4), says that to use this defense, the accused must have taken all reasonable steps to verify the complainant’s age. The trial judge acquitted her, finding reasonable doubt about whether the Crown proved she *didn't* take those reasonable steps. The Court of Appeal, however, overturned that, ordering a new trial. That's where it gets interesting. The Supreme Court stepped in, and their analysis is what makes this case crucial. The big question was: Did the trial judge actually make legal errors in assessing those "reasonable steps"? Remember, the Court of Appeal can only intervene in acquittals if there's an error of law. The Supreme Court said, "Nope." They found no legal errors. This highlights a critical point: determining what creates "reasonable doubt" is incredibly fact-specific. The more reasonable the accused's initial belief about the complainant's age, the fewer steps are reasonably required to verify it. It's a sliding scale, really. The Court also clarified a really interesting point about evidence. Can evidence that comes to light *after* the sexual activity be considered when determining if the accused took reasonable steps? The answer is yes. Evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of the accused's perception of the complainant's age *before* the contact is relevant, even if it emerges later or wasn't known at the time. Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized that even if there *had* been legal errors, they wouldn't have justified the Court of Appeal's intervention. There had to be a reasonable degree of certainty that those errors were material to the verdict. That's a high bar. The Supreme Court ultimately allowed the appeal and restored the original acquittals. They basically said the Court of Appeal overstepped its bounds, improperly turning disagreements with the trial judge's factual interpretations into supposed legal errors. R. v. George is a powerful reminder of the importance of contextual analysis in legal decision-making, especially when it comes to reasonable doubt and the delicate balance between protecting vulnerable individuals and ensuring fair trials. It highlights the limitations of appellate review and the deference owed to trial judges in fact-finding. It's a case that keeps us thinking about the nuances of consent, perception, and the burden of proof.